Hegel's relation to Kant is often portrayed in terms of epistemic impatience. For W.H.
I
How are we to understand Kant's notion of a critique of reason? One well-known interpretation, offered by Strawson, takes its cue from the tradition of 'classical empiricism'. 4 On this view, Kant's contribution is to show that our experience is more structured than the empiricists are willing to allow. The critique of reason is consequently understood as criticism of reason's fraudulent claims to possess metaphysical knowledge.
'The first task of philosophy is to set its own limits', 5 Strawson cautions. This appears to have an unmistakably Kantian ring. But, does it? On Strawson's account, setting limits consists in identifying the boundary between knowledge and nonsense. This is done through the 'principle of significance', which stipulates that 'there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their application '. 6 This is an attractive reading that makes good sense of a key proposition defended in the Critique, namely that 'thoughts without intuitions are empty', or that a concept that is not related to an object of possible experience 'has no sense (Sinn), and is entirely empty of content '. 7 However, Strawson's interpretation is unsatisfactory in at least one respect. By interpreting Kant's notion of an 'empty' thought as a meaningless thought, it places Kant in the invidious position of having to explain how meaning arises by the mere addition of sensible content. This would suggest that Kant is indeed an empiricist, seeking to derive the meaning of concepts from sensory input. But this is clearly not Kant's position.
Rather he insists that intuition and the understanding each make a distinctive and 8 In other words, we cannot claim that we know something unless that of which we speak conforms with the formal conditions of possible experience. Conversely, the unschematised categories are not meaningless, but merely lacking objective or, as Kant puts it, 'determinate meaning'. 9 This fits with his insistence that the categories are the basic functions or forms of thought of an object in general: 'we cannot think an object save through categories'. 10 He further clarifies that 'for thought the categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unlimited field'. 11 It is precisely because the categories open up this unlimited field that we employ them in judgements that have no empirical content. We are thus tempted to apply the concept of existence to God, or that of substance to the soul. Whilst a desire to avoid getting entangled in such dialectical thickets may well motivate
Strawson's reading, I believe that there are grounds other than hermeneutic fidelity on which it should be resisted. The clean separation that Strawson proposes between Kant's 'analytical argument' and the dark transcendentalism of the 'synthetic a priori' sets the stage for the fundamentally Humean conclusion, which Strawson elsewhere endorses, namely that there is no such thing as the reasons for which we hold our basic epistemic beliefs. 12 Capitulation to this Humean position, however, leaves us with a problematic and unsatisfactory conception of the limits of rational reflection, which are treated as something essentially inexplicable, an unfathomable given that at the same time is responsible for the good running of the epistemic practices it determines. This is precisely, however, the position Kant sets out to refute in the Critique of Pure Reason. To show that reason is capable of critical self-reflection, and thus that the task of self- the incoherence of a cosmological idea that 'both purports to refer and explicitly exempts itself from the conditions under which reference is possible'. 28 The advantage of
Allison's reconstruction is that it makes perspicuous Kant's argument against 'transcendental realism', which 'dogmatically' presupposes that objective reality is a
given. However, the claim that we cannot know something without being in possession of the conditions of its knowability hardly seems worth the trouble of the elaborate construction of four antinomies. I shall argue that although the antinomy is indeed supposed to provide indirect support for the central epistemic thesis of the Critique, it fulfils another important task that Allison overlooks: antinomial reasoning is the means by which reason gains self-knowledge.
In the Preface to the B edition, Kant gives us an important clue for how we should read the Antinomy. He argues that the deduction is merely the 'first assessment of our rational cognition a priori' and that only with the antinomy are we able to carry out a 'cross- 34 it cannot be the assumption that motivates the antinomial conflict.
As Walsh points out, this is because it is either trivially wrong (an appearance is not a thing in itself), or wrong only if we are already convinced of the truth of transcendental idealism. 35 In either case, the Antinomy cannot be thought of as providing a genuine touchstone for the new method of thinking. There is, however, another assumption shared by both the thesis and the antithesis perspectives. We can identify this common assumption, if we follow the interpretative line originally proposed by Sadik Al-Azm who interprets the antinomies with reference to the Leibniz/Newton dispute set out in
Leibniz's correspondence with Clarke. 36 In the correspondence, the dispute is presented as a disagreement about the application of the principle of sufficient reason to which both parties subscribe. 37 Both Leibniz and Clarke agree that without the principle 'that nothing happens without a reason why it should be so and not otherwise' no metaphysical propositions could ever be demonstrated. 38 Yet what for one counts as a sufficient reason is for the other a reason to prolong the search for it. The problem is generated by the principle of sufficient reason itself. It is a substantive principle masquerading as a formal one: it does not stipulate that for every event there is a cause, but rather that there is a 'reason' that exhaustively determines the result and is immediately recognisable as such.
Kant harnesses the inherent ambiguity of this principle to show that whilst both parties assume that there is a state of affairs that fully justifies their respective positions, thus bringing the enquiry to a close, they fail to agree about what it is that has this explanatory power. The resulting conflict is thus genuinely immanent, for it arises from a hitherto we do not hold upon sufferance but which are rightfully ours.
II
The purpose of the tribunal of pure reason is to place metaphysics on the secure path of Philosophy, he argues, cannot borrow its method from mathematics, any more than it can rely on the 'categorical assurances of inner intuition'. 42 Rather, its 'method of knowing' must be generated out of its own 'content'. Although it is as yet unclear how such an autochthonously philosophical method will be generated, it is not difficult to detect in this declaration an echo of the thesis that 'reason has insight into what it produces after a plan of its own'. 43 As I argued previously, this thesis should be understood as proposing that the claims of reason must be adjudicated internally, rather than by reference to some external realm of facts. However, I have also argued that, for Kant, this claim has a corollary that reason knows itself through self-criticism. 46 This may lead us to suspect that, rather than letting thought range 'unchecked wherever it chooses', as Walsh fears, Hegel seeks to confine it within a rigorous but quasi-hermetic system that sets its own conditions of intelligibility.
The most powerful version of this criticism has been put forward by Michael Rosen.
Rosen's interpretation is of especial interest because he combines the familiar view of the Kant-Hegel relation I sketched at the beginning of the paper with the one that I would like to defend, namely that dialectic functions as the inner discipline of thought. Rosen attributes to Hegel the belief that 'philosophy need not be restricted, as Kant had thought it must, to the finite, merely discursive sphere'. 47 On Rosen's account, Hegel's supposed abandonment of the 'discursive sphere' is a symptom of his 'speculative NeoPlatonism'. 48 And the problem with speculative Neo-Platonism is that whilst it is wrong, it cannot be shown to be wrong, because its 'truth' depends on the dialectical 'experience of Thought', which Rosen calls 'hyperintuition'. 49 What blocks the critical evaluation of The concept of 'bound' is introduced as a promising candidate for 'determinateness'. This is because the 'bound' of something just is its 'immanent determination', 52 and thus enables us to think something fully as it is, without reference to any external conditions.
However, in what appears to be a sudden change of register, Hegel further identifies 'bound' with something 'finite'. 53 He then explains that finite things 'are, but the truth of their being is their end', so that 'the hour of their birth is the hour of their death'.
54
How do we get from determining something to finite somethings? The section starts with a problem: we determine something by reference to some 'other', which, however, cannot be determined unless our original 'something' functions as its 'other'. 55 This vacillation from one to the other is frustrating because our aim is to capture the 'isolated' thing as it is, rather than as it is relative to a set of contingently thrown together 'others'. 56 One way out of this, Hegel suggests, is by distinguishing between the 'abstract', 'inner quality', or 'determination' of a thing and its 'external' or 'relational'
features. The concept of a 'bound' captures the 'determination' of something, or what something is, whilst internalising the other-relation that frustrated the previous attempt at 'determinateness'. The bound is thus the 'non-being of the other'. 57 The thought here is that in order to determine something, that is, in order to distinguish between the bundles of qualities that make up 'something' and 'other', we must already somehow be able to distinguish between basic and relational features of each thing. So, for example, to say that the boundary of the desk is its 'not being' floor is simply an awkward way of saying that in order to know where one thing stops, or 'ceases to be', and an other thing begins, I
must already have a sense of the basic 'determination' of 'desk' and 'floor'. It is here that what the relevant 'other' is). But this is precisely what we seek to discover. Since we cannot assume such knowledge as given, the concept of bound must remain empty.
Although the teleological path leads us to a problematic conclusion -we need to presuppose what we seek to discover-Hegel's teleological elaboration of the concept of 'bound' makes, nonetheless, an important contribution to the earlier discussion determinateness. This is initially obscured because Hegel employs a typically allusive vocabulary. 'Determination', he argues, is 'the unrest of the something in its bound (Grenze), in which it [the something] is immanent, an unrest which is the contradiction which impels the something out beyond itself'. 59 Determination appears here to be an organic rather than a logical process. Hegel's examples re-inforce this impression. He claims, for instance, that the point dialectically transcends its limitation to become a line;
that 'in oxidation', the base 'transcends its limit (Schranke) of existing only as a base'; 60 that the plant 'transcends the limitation of being a seed' and that 'in the limitation of hunger' the sentient creature 'is the urge to overcome this limitation'. 61 In these examples
Hegel uses 'limit' (Schranke) to refer to a particular state of something, the state of being a point, a base, a seed, hungry, etc. Although these examples can be read teleologically, the emphasis is not on the purported telos of the something, but on the instability of its 'limit': thus, points become lines, bases oxidise, etc. What is the significance of this for determinateness? It means, quite simply, that in order to identify something as a seed, one needs to know all sorts of things about seeds, including that they grow into plants, but that not all one knows to be true of seeds is relevant in determining 'seed'. This is a clarification or 'exposition' (Darstellung) of the original question of determinateness. By the end of the section on bounds, we discover that what we seek is a way of re-identifying something in different contexts, or of recognising it through its different states, or again, of taking the 'limits' of the thing as belonging in its 'immanent determination' or 'bound'. This, however, is not a summative process, whereby every possible state or 'limit' of the thing is added up, but rather a selective process, because not everything that is the case about something counts as its immanent determination. It is in summing up these results that Hegel makes the famous claim that to fix a limit (Schranke) is already to transcend it.
62
But what sort of outcome is this? We are certainly not given a set of instructions for achieving determinateness. Do we then have a positive result, a 'new shape' as Rosen suggests? It does not quite seem so. What we find out is that adequately to bound something, or to obtain a genuinely immanent determination, we must be satisfied that the elements or 'limits' (Schranke) we select are not arbitrarily chosen features, or as Hegel says later, the result of merely 'external reflection of the subjective thinker'. What the judgement enunciates to start with is that the subject is the predicate; but since the predicate is supposed not to be what the subject is,
we are faced with a contradiction which must resolve itself, pass over into a result.
75
The contradiction arises because, for the judgement to be both genuinely informative and essentially determining, the copula must have both a predicative function ('s is P' is informative, if P is different from s) and an identity function ('s is P' is determining, if P is s and nothing else). 76 At first brush, this seems like an artificial problem. When I say 'this action is good' I don't also say 'this action is not good'. True, 'good' is also predicable of other subjects, besides this one. Using 's is not P', 'this action is not good', to express the thought that universals determine by being predicable to more than one particular seems forced. This 'contradiction' arises only because we have an ambitious conception of determination: we want to form a judgement that is both genuinely informative and essentially determining. We could say, then, that the 'hidden premise' that produces the contradiction is the conception of determination we started with. But this is not the whole story. For what we are confronted with here is a variation on the problem of bounds: that which enables us to grasp the thing as it is is a relation to an 'other'. In the context of the discussion of bounds, the question at issue is: what is the relevant 'other'? Here, the question is: what is the nature of this other-relation? In judgement, the 'other' of the subject under determination is the predicate and thus the relation that gives us the concept of the thing just is the thing; the 'determinateness of the Notion' is 'posited in the Notion itself', 77 or, in Hegel's examples, 'this action is good', 'Gaius is learned', 'the rose is a plant'. But successful predication in these instances is premised on a further other-relation that is only implicitly acknowledged in these judgements. What enables us to identify the subject as so and so is a further 'hidden' premise about this action, Gaius, or the rose. So, although subject and predicate are held together in a single judgement, the way this judgement determines depends on a more complex procedure than that given in 's is P'. Hegel's insistence that s is also not P simply alerts us to this. Contradiction thus serves to exhibit the complexity of judgement by complicating the seemingly straightforward role of the copula 'is'.
We can see now that contradiction is not part of a mystical or irrationalist project, but rather an integral part of the dialectical 'bounding' of thought, by means of which Hegel seeks to sharpen the questions that arise in trying to think even the simplest thing, viz.
what something is. It has a 'boundary-setting' role in that it encourages us to search for reasons for the conceptual choices we make and for the intellectual commitments we undertake in using terms such as 'subject', 'predicate', 'particular', 'universal'. Hegel's project can, therefore, properly be called a 'critique of thought'. This is a critique with emphatically positive results: the unconditioned or absolute determinateness of the 'Idea'.
However, the 'Idea' is not an extra piece of knowledge, but merely the end point of a line of argument that Hegel pursues in the Doctrine of Notion and that aims to present (darstellen) thought as a unity of thought and thinking, or of determination and conditions of determination. The key, or in Hegel's terms, the 'soul and substance' 78 of the Logic is the dialectical discipline: the fullest determination of the bounds of thought is thus not contained in the absolute Idea but dialectically thought through.
We are now in position to see that, despite the important differences between Kantian critique and Hegelian dialectic, both projects present us with a similar conception of the task of philosophy. Both identify philosophy as a search for rational self-knowledge. 
